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Expanding Disclosure in Control Transactions:
The Proposed Significant Equity
Participant Regulations and The
Co-Bidder Cases
DANIEL L. GOELZER* AND SUSAN NASH**
INTRODUCTION
The Securities and Exchange Commission recently published
for comment proposals (Proposed Rules) that would require in-
creased disclosure concerning significant equity participants in lim-
ited partnerships, closely-held corporations, and similar entities
engaged in control transactions.' In the release accompanying the
Proposed Rules, the Commission described the prevalence of
closely-held entities as a source of financing in control transactions.
The Commission noted that limited partnerships were used as a
source of financing in approximately 27% of the hostile tender of-
fers commenced in fiscal year 1988, and that, in some cases, the
acquiring person was a newly formed entity, with no operations
and with the sole purpose of acquiring control of the target corn-
* General Counsel, Securities and Exchange Commission.
** Attorney, Securities and Exchange Commission.
As a matter of policy, the Securities and Exchange Commission disclaims
responsibility for any private publication or statement by any of its employees. The views
expressed herein are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the
Commission or of the authors' colleagues on the staff of the Commission.
1. 54 Fed. Reg. 10,360 (1989) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 240) (proposed March
13, 1989). Throughout this Article, the term "control transactions" refers to four types of
transactions: major acquisitions of securities, tender offers, proxy contests, and going
private transactions.
BUSINESS LAW JOURNAL
pany. Likewise, the Commission observed that closely-held entities
have played similar roles in proxy contests, for example, in the
proxy contest for Gillette Co., Inc., conducted by The Coniston
Group where the identity of, and control exercised by, limited part-
ners was a central issue in litigation between the parties. The Com-
mission noted that even after The Coniston Group amended its
disclosure to identify the limited partners of the filing persons, the
disclosure merely revealed another level of limited partnerships and
that no information was provided about the limited partners, other
than that capital contributions provided a source of funds for the
acquisition of securities.2 In describing the need for disclosure with
respect to significant equity participants in limited partnerships,
closely-held corporations, and similar entities, the Commission ex-
plained that, under current rules, disclosure of information about
significant equity participants, although it may be material to
shareholders and the market, may not be required.'
The issuance of the Proposed Rules is not the only response
that has been made to concerns about the sufficiency of disclosure
2. Id. at 10,362. See also Gillette Co. v. RB Partners, 693 F. Supp. 1266 (D. Mass.
1988) (whether advertisement placed by Gillette purporting to reveal participants in The
Coniston Group was false or misleading). Cf. Rich and Klarish, Expanding Disclosure of
Partnership Interests in Control Transactions, 3 INSIGHTS 23 (1989) (Information regarding
the equity participants in a takeover has sometimes been sought as a source of information
regarding possible defenses to the takeover. Such defenses have included public relations
campaigns exposing the unsavory nature, confidential financial information, or foreign
background of the participants, as well as allegations of violations of the nargin rules, the
Investment Company Act of 1940 (15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-l-80a-64 (1988)), or applicable
industry regulations.).
3. 54 Fed. Reg., supra note 1, at 10,362. Even the identity of limited partners may not
be publicly available, since many state statutes governing limited partnerships do not
require the inclusion of limited partners' identities in the certificate of limited partnership
filed with the state. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 17-201(a) (Supp. 1988); D.C. CODE
ANN. § 41-421(a) (Supp. 1989); MD. CORPS. & ASS'NS CODE ANN. § 10-201(a) (Supp.
1989).
The increased use of partnerships as acquisition vehicles has caused difficulties in the
antitrust area as well as the securities area. Under section 7A of the Clayton Act, 15
U.S.C. § 18a (1988), persons contemplating certain acquisitions of assets or voting
securities are required to provide advance notice to the Federal Trade Commission and the
Department of Justice. In a recent advance notice of proposed rulemaking, the Federal
Trade Commission noted its concern with, and sought comment with respect to, the
existence of non-reportable transactions that may raise antitrust concerns, particularly
where partnerships are used as the acquisition vehicle. 54 Fed. Reg. 7,960 (1989)
(February 24, 1989).
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about participants in control transactions. In recent years, tender
offer targets have argued that persons with various roles in tender
offers are "co-bidders" with respect to the tender offers and, ac-
cordingly, subject to the securities law disclosure requirements that
apply to tender offerors. Thus, a significant body of case law has
developed, articulating when a tender offer participant is a co-bid-
der subject to such disclosure requirements.' The forms of partici-
pation in tender offers considered by the cases have included
participation as a shareholder of a privately-held acquiring corpo-
ration and as a lender where loan fees were tied to the results of the
tender offer. Several recent cases involved a determination of the
co-bidder status of an investment bank that played multiple roles
(such as advisor, underwriter, equity partner, and financier) in a
tender offer.
This Article will outline the present statutory and regulatory
structure with respect to disclosure required by and about partici-
pants in control transactions. It will then examine two principal
mechanisms that have recently been developed to ensure that mate-
rial disclosure is provided concerning participants playing varied
roles in control transactions: the Proposed Rules and the co-bidder
cases.
I. PRESENT STATUTORY AND REGULATORY STRUCTURE
The purpose of disclosure requirements applicable to control
transactions is to provide full and fair disclosure for the benefit of
4. See MAI Basic Four, Inc. v. Prime Computer, Inc., 871 F.2d 212 (1st Cir. 1989);
City Capital Associates Ltd. Partnership v. Interco Inc., 860 F.2d 60 (3d Cir. 1988);
Prudent Real Estate Trust v. Johncamp Realty, Inc., 599 F.2d 1140 (2d Cir. 1979);
Arkansas Best Corp. v. Pearlman, 688 F. Supp. 976 (D. Del. 1988); Polaroid Corp. v.
Disney, 862 F.2d 987 (3d Cir. 1988); Koppers Co. v. American Express Co., 689 F. Supp.
1371 (W.D. Pa. 1988); Macfadden Holdings, Inc. v. John Blair & Co., Civ. No. 86-161
MMS (D. Del. May 16, 1986); Wamaco, Inc. v. Galef, Civ. No. B-86-146 (PCD) (D. Conn.
April 3, 1986) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file), aff'd mere., 800 F.2d 1129 (2d Cir.
1986); Van Dusen Air, Inc. v. APL Ltd. Partnership, Civ. No. 4-85-1256 (D. Minn. Sept.
20, 1985); Revlon, Inc. v. Pantry Pride, Inc., 621 F. Supp. 804 (D. Del. 1985); Pabst
Brewing Co. v. Kalmanovitz, 551 F. Supp. 882 (D. Del. 1982), aff'd mem. sub nor. Jacobs
v. Pabst Brewing Co., 707 F.2d 1392 (3d Cir. 1982); Gray Drug Stores, Inc. v. Simmons,
522 F. Supp. 961 (N.D. Ohio 1981); Riggs Nat'l Bank v. Allbritton, 516 F. Supp. 164
(D.D.C. 1981).
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investors.5 The disclosure requirements applicable to four types of
control transactions - major acquisitions of securities,6 tender of-
fers,7 proxy contests,8 and going private transactions9 - are de-
scribed below.
Any person who, after acquiring the beneficial ownership of
any equity security of a class registered under section 12 of the Se-
curities Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange Act) (or certain other
specified equity securities), is the beneficial owner of more than 5%
of the class is required to make certain disclosures within ten days
after the acquisition."° The Commission has prescribed" that such
disclosures are to be made on a Schedule 13D.' 2
Likewise, it is unlawful to make a tender offer for any class of
any equity security which is registered pursuant to section 12 of the
Exchange Act (or certain other specified equity securities) if, after
consummation thereof, the offeror would be the beneficial owner of
more than 5% of the class, unless certain disclosures are made at
the time copies of the offer are first published or sent or given to
security holders.' 3 The Commission has prescribed' 4 that such dis-
5. See, e.g., 54 Fed. Reg., supra note 1, at 10,361 (disclosure requirements designed to
publicize material facts concerning nature of transaction and participants so security
holders have opportunity to make informed investment decisions); S. REP. No. 550, 90th
Cong., 1st Sess. 3 and H.R. REP. No. 1711, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 4, reprinted in 1968 U. S.
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2811, 2813 ("[The Williams Act] is designed to require full
and fair disclosure for the benefit of investors while at the same time providing the offeror
and management equal opportunity to fairly present their case."). See also Securities Act
Release No. 6022, Exchange Act Release No. 15548, Investment Company Act Release
No. 10575, [1979 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 81,935, at 81,207 (Feb. 5,
1979) ("In the context of tender offers, the Commission is empowered to require full and
fair disclosure for the benefit of investors and to permit both the [bidder] and the
management of the [target] an equal opportunity to fairly present their positions."); Piper
v. Chris-Craft Industries, Inc., 430 U.S. 1, 28-31 (1977); Rondeau v. Mosinee Paper Corp.,
422 U.S. 49, 58-59 (1975); Sonesta Int'l Hotels Corp. v. Wellington Associates, 483 F.2d
247, 249 (2d Cir. 1973); Bolton v. Gramlich, 540 F. Supp. 822, 836 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
6. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d) (1988).
7. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d) (1988).
8. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1988).
9. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(e) (1988).
10. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)(l) (1988).
11. 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-l(a) (1989).
12. 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-101 (1989).
13. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(1) (1988).
14. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-3(a) (1989).
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closures are to be made by "bidders" on Schedule 14D-1.15 For
this purpose, the Commission has defined a "bidder" generally as
"any person who makes a tender offer or on whose behalf a tender
offer is made."' 6
In the case of proxy contests, it is unlawful to solicit a proxy
for any security (other than an exempted security) registered pursu-
ant to section 12 of the Exchange Act if the solicitation contravenes
the Commission's rules and regulations. 7 The Commission has
prescribed'" that, in the case of a person other than the issuer, no
proxy solicitation may be made unless the person has filed the in-
formation specified by Schedule 14B.19
In the case of going private transactions, it is unlawful for an
issuer (or any person controlling, controlled by, or under common
control with the issuer) which has a class of equity securities regis-
tered pursuant to section 12 of the Exchange Act (or which is a
closed-end investment company registered under the Investment
Company Act of 1940)20 to purchase any equity security issued by
it if the purchase contravenes rules and regulations adopted by the
Commission (i) to define acts and practices which are fraudulent,
deceptive, or manipulative and (ii) to prescribe means reasonably
designed to prevent such acts and practices. 21 The Commission has
prescribed2 2 that, in connection with a going private transaction,
the issuer (or any person controlling, controlled by, or under com-
mon control with the issuer) is required to file Schedule 13E-3.2 a
Each of Schedules 13D, 14D-l, 14B, and 13E-3 provides for
disclosure by the filing person with respect to itself. The informa-
tion to be provided generally includes the identity and background
of the filing person, the purpose of the transaction, plans or propos-
15. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-100 (1989).
16. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-l(b)(1) (1989). Cf 12 C.F.R. § 11.601(b)(1) (1989) (Under
regulations issued by Comptroller of the Currency applicable to tender offers for bank
securities, "bidder" has the meaning outlined in the text.).
17. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1988).
18. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-I1(c)(1) (1989).
19. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-102 (1989).
20. 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-1-80a-64 (1988).
21. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(e) (1988).
22. 17 C.F.R. § 240.13e-3(a)(1) & (d) (1989).
23. 17 C.F.R. § 240.13e-100 (1989).
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als for the issuer, the source and amount of funds for the transac-
tion, and any borrowing for the transaction. In addition, each
Schedule requires more limited disclosure by the filing person with
respect to certain other persons. General Instruction C of Schedule
13D is representative:
If the statement is filed by a general or limited partnership, syn-
dicate, or other group, the information called for by Items 2-6,
inclusive, shall be given with respect to (i) each partner of such
general partnership; (ii) each partner who is denominated as a
general partner or who functions as a general partner of such
limited partnership; (iii) each member of such syndicate or
group; and (iv) each person controlling such partner or member.
If the statement is filed by a corporation or if a person referred
to in (i), (ii), (iii) or (iv) of this Instruction is a corporation, the
information called for by the above mentioned items shall be
given with respect to (a) each executive officer and director of
such corporation; (b) each person controlling such corporation;
and (c) each executive officer and director of any corporation or
other person ultimately in control of such corporation.2
4
The language of General Instruction C of Schedules 14D-125
and 13E-326 is identical to the foregoing Instruction in relevant re-
spects, and similar language is found in Instruction 2 of Schedule
14B. 27 Pursuant to these instructions, if the filing person is a lim-
ited partnership, the filing person must provide specified informa-
tion with respect to each partner who is denominated as a general
partner or who functions as a general partner of such limited part-
nership,2 and if the filing person is a corporation, the filing person
24. 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-101 (1989).
25. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-100 (1989).
26. 17 C.F.R. § 240.13e-100 (1989).
27. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-102 (1989).
28. See Securities Act Release No. 5844, Exchange Act Release No. 13787, Investment
Company Act Release No. 9862 [1977-78 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
81,256, at 88,375 (July 21, 1977) (no disclosure required with respect to limited partners
who do not act or have the power to act in a manner substantially equivalent to general
partners). Instruction 2 of Schedule B provides: "If the [filing person] is a partnership,
corporation, association or other business entity, the information called for by Item 2, 3
and 4(b) and (c) shall be given with respect to each partner, officer and director of such
entity, and each person controlling such entity, who is not a participant." 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.14a-102 (1989). By its terms, Instruction 2 does not distinguish between limited and
general partners of a limited partnership. However, Instruction 2 has been construed
[Vol. 1:1
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must provide specified information with respect to each person con-
trolling such corporation. The specified information generally re-
lates to identity, background, funding, and purposes.29 Under
current General Instructions C of Schedules 13D, 14D-1, and 13E-
3 and Instruction 2 of Schedule 14B, disclosure ordinarily is not
required with respect to a person who holds an equity interest in a
filing person, including a limited partner of a filing person that is a
limited partnership, unless the person has control (express or de
facto) over the filing person.
Nonetheless, in certain circumstances, the present statutory
and regulatory structure requires disclosure in control transactions
with respect to persons other than the filing person and persons
specified in General Instructions C of Schedules 13D, 14D-1, and
13E-3 and Instruction 2 of Schedule 14B. Thus, as the Commis-
sion indicated in the release issued in connection with the Proposed
Rules, "[t]he identification of significant equity participants and
certain additional information currently may be required under cir-
cumstances pursuant to specific items of the schedules. ' 30
This rationale has been applied by the Third Circuit in CNW
Corp. v. Japonica Partners, L.P. 1 In that case, Japonica Partners,
L.P., acted as the general partner of a number of limited partner-
ships formed for the purpose of acquiring common stock of CNW
Corporation. The Third Circuit held that Item 3(e) of Schedule
14B3 2 required Japonica to disclose the contents of the limited part-
nership agreements and the identities of the limited partners. In its
discussion, the Third Circuit analyzed the relationship between
consistently with Instructions C of Schedules 13D, 14D-1, and 13E-3. 54 Fed. Reg., supra
note 1, at 10,362. See also Rich and Klarish, supra note 2, at 24 ("[Als a practical matter,
[14B] filers generally do not furnish information relating to most limited partners.").
29. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-101 (1989) (Items 2 through 6); 17 C.F.R. § 14d-100
(1989) (Items 2 through 7); 17 C.F.R. § 240.13e-I00 (1989) (Items 2, 3, 5, 6, 10, and 11); 17
C.F.R. § 240.14a-102 (1989) (Items 2, 3, and 4(b) and (c)).
30. 54 Fed. Reg., supra note 1, at 10,363 n.24 (citing as examples Items 6 and 7 of
Schedule 13D and Items 7 and 11 of Schedule 14D-).
31. 874 F.2d 193 (3d Cir. 1989).
32. Item 3(e) requires the filing person to state whether or not it is, or was "within the
past year, a party to any contract, arrangements or understandings with any person with
respect to any securities of the registrant" and, if so, to "name the parties to such contracts,
arrangements or understandings and give the details thereof." 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-102
(1989).
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specific items of Schedules 13D and 14B, on the one hand, and
Instructions C and 2 thereof, on the other:
Instructions C and 2 of those schedules stipulate the entities and
persons, in addition to the filer, with respect to whom the infor-
mation required by each item must be supplied when the filer is
not a natural person. Their effect is to expand the information
required to be disclosed by increasing the number of entities and
persons with respect to whom the filer must supply a name, the
amount of securities of the registrant held, the details of con-
tracts with respect to such securities to which such entity or
person is a party, and other information. Contrary to Japonica's
argument, the effect of these instructions is not to restrict the
information that the filer must supply with respect to itself.33
II. PROPOSED RULES
The Proposed Rules, which are intended to provide sharehold-
ers with material information concerning significant equity partici-
pants in limited partnerships, closely-held corporations, and similar
entities engaged in control transactions, reflect the Commission's
concern that the current instructions to Schedules 13D, 14D-1,
14B, and 13E-3 may not adequately provide shareholders and the
marketplace with material information about significant partici-
pants in control transactions. 34 The current instructions to Sched-
ules 13D, 14D-l, 14B, and 13E-3 require disclosure about the
acquiring entity and persons acting in an express or defacto control
relationship with the acquiring entity. Absent such a control rela-
tionship, disclosure generally is not required with respect to per-
sons who contribute significant capital to, or are entitled to receive
33. 874 F.2d at 200. But see, HUBCO, Inc. v. Rappaport, 628 F. Supp. 345, 357-58
(D.N.J. 1985) (Instruction C of Schedule 13D, "requiring information only from the
general partner in a limited partnership, controls over the moie general instruction in Item
3."). Item 3 provides that "if any part of the purchase price is or will be represented by
funds or other consideration borrowed or otherwise obtained for the purpose of acquiring,
holding, trading or voting the securities," the filing person is required to provide "a
description of the transaction and the names of the parties thereto." 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-
101 (1989). The release accompanying the Proposed Rules indicates that, to the extent that
HUBCO suggests that Instruction C does not require disclosure of limited partners even if
control is demonstrated, the Commission disagrees and proposes to revise the instruction to
make this clear. 54 Fed. Reg., supra note I, at 10,364 n.26.
34. 54 Fed. Reg., supra note 1, at 10,360-61.
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a significant interest in the profits or assets of, the acquiring en-
tity.35 In the release accompanying the Proposed Rules, the Com-
mission noted that, notwithstanding the absence of a control
relationship, information about significant equity participants may
be material to shareholders and the marketplace for at least three
reasons.
First, the agreement to provide a significant equity contribu-
tion to a transaction, without more, in many instances may provide
a form of implicit control or potential influence. Second, upon liq-
uidation or dissolution of the filing person, equity participants
could become beneficial owners of a significant block of the ac-
quired entity's stock. Third, information concerning an equity par-
ticipant may be particularly material where the equity participant
also participates in the transaction in another capacity because, ab-
sent full disclosure of the entire interest of the equity participant,
shareholders may be misled as to the nature of the equity partici-
pant's interest in the transaction.3 6 The Proposed Rules are in-
tended to assure (i) that material information about significant
equity participants would be disclosed and (ii) that persons whose
equity participation in the acquiring entity could provide influence
over management (which influence may be difficult to prove) would
be identified. a In this regard, the Commission would intend that
the revised instructions to Schedules 13D, 14D-1, 14B, and 13E-3
be interpreted to require disclosure if information about a signifi-
cant participant in a control transaction would otherwise be
omitted. 3
The Proposed Rules would amend the instructions to Sched-
ules 13D, 14D-l, 14B, and 13E-3 to require that responses be pro-
vided to specified items of the Schedules relating to the identity,
background, funding, and purposes of the filing person with respect
to each person who (i) contributes more than 10% of the equity
capital of the filing person or (ii) has a right to receive in the aggre-
gate, directly or indirectly, more than 10% of the profits, or upon
35. 54 Fed. Reg., supra note 1, at 10,362.
36. 54 Fed. Reg., supra note 1, at 10,362.
37. 54 Fed. Reg., supra note 1, at 10,362.
38. 54 Fed Reg., supra note 1, at 10,363.
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liquidation 10% of the assets, of the filing person. 9 Such informa-
tion would be required whether or not the significant equity partici-
pant would be deemed a controlling person of the filing person."
The capital contribution test is intended to prevent evasion of the
disclosure requirements by using special allocations to avoid a 10%
interest in profits or assets.4 '
If a Schedule is filed by multiple persons acting as a group,42
the 10% standard would apply at the group level, i.e., disclosure
would be required with respect to persons who contribute more
than 10% of the equity capital of the group or have a right to re-
ceive more than 10% of the profits or assets of the group and not
with respect to persons who merely contribute more than 10% of
the equity capital of a member of the group or have a right to re-
ceive more than 10% of the profits or assets of a member of the
group.4" Application of the 10% standard at the group level is in-
tended to limit the number of equity participants covered by the
disclosure requirements." The new disclosure requirements with
respect to significant equity participants would not apply where the
filing person has a class of equity securities registered under section
12 of the Exchange Act because information concerning such eq-
uity participants is already required to be disclosed under the bene-
39. The following addition to General Instruction C of Schedule 13D is representative:
If the person filing the statement is other than a natural person and does not
have a class of equity securities registered under Section 12 of the [Exchange]
Act, or if the statement is filed by a group that includes such entities, in
addition to the information required above, information for Items 2-6,
inclusive, shall be provided for each person who contributes more than 10
percent of the equity capital, or has a right to receive in the aggregate, directly
or indirectly, more than 10 percent of the profits, or upon dissolution or
liquidation, 10 percent of the assets of that person or group. Such disclosure
shall be required notwithstanding the absence of a control relationship.
54 Fed. Reg., supra note 1, at 10,365.
40. 54 Fed. Reg., supra note 1, at 10,363. The Proposed Rules would also clarify that
Instructions C of Schedules 13D, 14D-l. and 13E-3 and Instruction 2 of Schedule 14B
apply to persons who control limited partnerships or other non-corporate entities. 54 Fed.
Reg., supra note 1, at 10,363. See supra note 33.
41. 54 Fed. Reg., supra note 1, at 10,363.
42. See Exchange Act §§ 13(d)(3) & 14(d)(2), 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d)(3) & 78n(d)(2)
(1988) ("When two or more persons act as a partnership, limited partnership, syndicate, or
other group for the purpose of acquiring, holding, or disposing of securities of an issuer,
such syndicate or group shall be deemed a 'person' for the purpose of this subsection.").
43. 54 Fed. Reg., supra note I, at 10,363.
44. 54 Fed. Reg., supra note 1, at 10,363.
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ficial ownership reporting requirements of sections 13(d)45 and
13(g) 46 of the Exchange Act and in periodic reports and proxy
materials of the issuer.47
The Proposed Rules would not impose reporting requirements
on additional persons or amend the items of disclosure to broaden
the disclosure required. Instead, the Proposed Rules would in-
crease the information required to be provided by the filing person
by requiring information regarding certain equity participants to be
provided by the filing person.4 8 The Proposed Rules would not, by
their terms, require the disclosure of financial information of a sig-
nificant equity participant. Current law would be unchanged in
this regard. That is, if the interest and control exercised by an eq-
uity participant were sufficient to make it a bidder,49 financial infor-
mation, if material, would be required. 0
In its request for comments on the Proposed Rules, the Com-
mission noted a number of specific areas with respect to which it
sought comment, including whether 10% was the appropriate level
of equity participation at which disclosure should be required;
whether the new disclosure requirement should apply only to a
specified number of the filing person's largest equity participants
who meet the threshold level of participation; whether additional
criteria should be considered in imposing a disclosure obligation,
such as whether the acquiring entity was formed generally for ac-
quisition purposes or solely for the acquisition of a single issuer;
and whether the proposals would benefit shareholders and the mar-
ketplace and would be subject to evasion.5 ' The comment period
for the Proposed Rules closed on May 12, 1989.52 The staff of the
Commission will review the comments received before proposing
45. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d) (1988).
46. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(g) (1988).
47. 54 Fed. Reg., supra note 1, at 10,363.
48. 54 Fed. Reg., supra note 1, at 10,363. Of course, certain information with respect
to such equity participants presently may be required pursuant to specific items of the
Schedules. See supra notes 30-33 and accompanying text.
49. See infra notes 54-105 and accompanying text.
50. 54 Fed. Reg., supra note 1, at 10,364.
51. 54 Fed. Reg., supra note 1, at 10,363.
52. 54 Fed. Reg., supra note 1, at 10,361.
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further action with respect to the Proposed Rules.5 3
III. Co-BIDDER CASES
As discussed above,54 the requirement to file a Schedule 14D- 1
in connection with a tender offer is imposed by regulation on "bid-
ders," i.e., the persons who make the tender offer or on whose be-
half the tender offer is made. The Commission has stated that the
term "bidder" was intended to provide a short-hand reference to a
principal participant in a tender offer and avoid certain pejorative
terms commonly used to describe participants in tender offers.5
A. Description of Co-Bidder Cases
A recent series of cases has addressed the issue of when a per-
son is a co-bidder with the acquiring entity. In these cases, the
courts were faced with the necessity of making determinations of
co-bidder status based on the particular facts presented. The co-
bidder cases generally have involved a challenge by the target of a
tender offer to the acquiring entity's disclosure on the ground that
some third person was a co-bidder with the acquiring entity and
was required to provide the information required by Schedule 14D-
1, particularly the financial information which may be required by
Item 9 of Schedule 14D- 1.56
53. Goelzer, Quinn, and Walter, Recent Developments in Tender Offer Regulation 66,
21st ANN. INST. ON SEC. REG. (1989).
54. See supra notes 14-16 and accompanying text.
55. Securities Act Release No. 6022, Exchange Act Release No. 15548, Investment
Company Act Release No. 10575 [1979 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
81,935, at 81,216 (Feb. 5, 1979).
56. See, e.g., City Capital Associates Ltd. Partnership v. Interco Inc., 860 F.2d 60 (3d
Cir. 1988); Arkansas Best Corp. v. Pearlman, 688 F. Supp. 976 (D. Del. 1988); Koppers
Co. v. American Express Co., 689 F. Supp. 1371 (W.D. Pa. 1988). Item 9 of Schedule
14D-1 provides:
Where the bidder is other than a natural person and the bidder's
financial condition is material to a decision by a security holder of the subject
company whether to sell, tender or hold securities being sought in the tender
offer, furnish current, adequate financial information concerning the bidder;
Provided, That if the bidder is controlled by another entity which is not a
natural person and has been formed for the purpose of making the tender
offer, furnish current, adequate financial information concerning such parent.
17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-100 (1989). Because Item 9 does not require financial statements from
all bidders, a finding of co-bidder status alone is not sufficient to impose an obligation to
disclose financial statements under Item 9. Accordingly, the co-bidder cases discuss not
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The earliest co-bidder cases, Prudent Real Estate Trust v.
Johncamp Realty, Inc.," Riggs National Bank v. Allbritton, 8 and
Gray Drug Stores, Inc. v. Simmons,5 9 involved a variety of fact pat-
terns. In Prudent Real Estate Trust, the Second Circuit determined
that a tender offer for shares of a real estate investment trust should
be enjoined pending disclosure pursuant to Item 9 of Schedule
14D- 1 of financial information about a corporate shareholder of the
acquiring corporation (and certain persons related to the share-
holder), where the shareholder owned 40% of the common shares
of the acquiring corporation; had agreed to provide 20% of the eq-
uity required for the offer in the form of a preferred stock invest-
ment in the acquiring corporation; would have exclusive control of
the voting of acquired target shares and, generally, management of
property received in respect of such shares; and would be retained
by the acquiring entity as an independent contractor responsible for
supervising implementation of decisions of the parties with respect
to the management and operation of the acquiring entity.
Prudent Real Estate Trust is not strictly speaking a co-bidder
case because the court apparently proceeded on the assumption
that the shareholder's status was such that financial information
about the shareholder, if material, was required to be disclosed
under Item 9 and focused its analysis on the materiality issue, con-
cluding that the financial information was material. Nonetheless,
the opinion is a forerunner of the co-bidder cases because the court
considered the same kinds of factors used by other courts to deter-
mine co-bidder status. As factors weighing against the need for
disclosure, the court noted that the shareholder with respect to
whom disclosure was sought was supplying only 20% of the financ-
ing and that the financial information of the 80% party to the
transaction (which was disclosed) showed it to be a company of
substance. As factors weighing in favor of disclosure, the court
noted that the shareholder with respect to whom disclosure was
only whether co-bidder status is present, but also whether the financial information of a co-
bidder is required to be disclosed under Item 9. The second issue, however, is beyond the
scope of this Article and will not be discussed herein.
57. 599 F.2d 1140 (2d Cir. 1979).
58. 516 F. Supp. 164 (D.D.C. 1981).
59. 522 F. Supp. 961 (N.D. Ohio 1981).
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sought had the right to vote all acquired target shares and certain
management rights with respect to the target shares."
A target's contention that certain corporate affiliates of an in-
dividual bidder were co-bidders was rejected by the United States
District Court for the District of Columbia in Riggs.6 The court
based its finding that the individual was the sole bidder on (i) clear
and convincing evidence that the debt to be incurred for the
purchase of the tendered shares was to be assumed solely and per-
sonally by the individual, (ii) evidence that during the individual's
discussions and negotiations regarding the tender offer, the focus
was on him as sole purchaser, and (iii) the absence of any credible
evidence from which the court could find that the individual was
acting in conjunction with his affiliates with respect to the tender
offer.62
The tender offeror in Gray Drug was National City Lines, Inc.
(NCL). Approximately 92% of the outstanding common stock of
NCL was owned by Contran Corporation (Contran), and approxi-
mately 99% of Contran's outstanding common stock was owned by
Contran Holding Company (Contran Holding), which in turn was
wholly owned by a trust established by Harold C. Simmons for the
benefit of his children and grandchild, of which Simmons was the
sole trustee. Simmons was chairman of the board of Contran Hold-
ing, president and a director of Contran, and chairman of the board
and chief executive officer of NCL.
The United States District Court for the Northern District of
Ohio, relying on the Riggs decision, concluded that "[a]bsent an
affirmative showing.., that NCL is acting in conjunction with its
affiliates with respect to this particular tender offer ... NCL alone
is the principal participant making the Offer and is the sole 'bidder'
."63 In rejecting the argument that Simmons, the trust, Contran
60. 599 F.2d at 1147.
61. The target in this case was a national banking association, and the disclosure
requirements were therefore administered by the Comptroller of the Currency. Exchange
Act section 12(i), 15 U.S.C. § 781(i) (1988). Pursuant to rules in effect at the time of the
Riggs case, the term "bidder" was defined by the Comptroller in the same manner as by the
Commission, ite., as "any person who makes a tender offer or on whose behalf a tender
offer is made." 516 F. Supp. at 171.
62. 516 F. Supp. at 171.
63. 522 F. Supp. at 967.
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Holding, and Contran were co-bidders, the court found that NCL's
ability to transfer its rights to purchase tendered shares to its affili-
ates was not sufficient, standing alone, to lead to the conclusion
that NCL's affiliates were co-bidders. 6 The court relied, in part,
on evidence that showed that NCL was the sole purchasing entity,
that NCL was to pay for all shares tendered, and that NCL had
adequate cash reserves to do so. 65
Several of the co-bidder cases, Pabst Brewing Co. v. Kalmano-
vitz,6' Arkansas Best Corp. v. Pearlman,67 and Warnaco, Inc. v.
Galef,68 involved acquiring entities that were formed specifically for
the purpose of making a tender offer. In Pabst, the target argued
that the individuals who owned 50% and 24.5%, respectively, of
the stock of the corporation that owned 100% of the corporate
tender offeror were the real bidders in the offer. The United States
District Court for the District of Delaware did not expressly con-
sider whether the individuals were, in fact, bidders, and, instead,
focused on whether financial information regarding them was ma-
terial.69 However, in discussing the materiality issue, the court
considered the role of the individuals in the tender offer, and con-
cluded that the individuals should have disclosed some financial in-
formation about themselves because they were the primary
motivating force behind the formation and capitalization of the
tender offeror for the sole purpose of effecting a tender offer by
using their personal finances. The court further found that the in-
dividuals were the dominant and motivating principals behind the
tender offer because they personally invested substantial capital to
capitalize the tender offer.70
The United States District Court for the District of Delaware
found that certain individuals were co-bidders with the acquiring
entity in Arkansas Best. Relying on Pabst, the court based its con-
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. 551 F. Supp. 882 (D. Del. 1982), aff'd mem sub nom. Jacobs v. Pabst Brewing Co.,
707 F.2d 1392 (3d Cir. 1982).
67. 688 F. Supp. 976 (D. Del. 1988).
68. Civ. No. B-86-146 (PCD) (D. Conn. April 3, 1986) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist
file), aff'd mem., 800 F.2d 1129 (2d Cir. 1986).
69. 551 F. Supp. at 889-94.
70. Id. at 892-93.
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clusion on the facts that a series of corporations and partnerships
were formed specifically to make the tender offer, that the individu-
als controlled the acquisition entities and were the primary moti-
vating force behind the tender offer, that the individuals
contributed $37,000,000 of the $280,000,000 needed for the tender
offer, and that their controlled corporations would contribute tar-
get shares worth $14,431,813.50 before consummation of the
tender offer. Accordingly, the court found that the individuals
were bidders as they were the "dominant and motivating princi-
pals" behind the tender offer.71
Warnaco involved the question of whether four individuals
were co-bidders where they contributed $6,000,000 to form the ac-
quiring corporation, which held no assets other than the foregoing
funds, engaged in no business, and was formed as a legal mecha-
nism for effecting the tender offer. The United States District
Court for the District of Connecticut found that the individuals
were not co-bidders because the offer was in the name of the corpo-
ration, which was not acting for the individuals. The court ex-
pressly found that the facts that the corporation had no purpose
other than to effect the tender offer and serve as a holding company
until merged with the target did not alter this result. The court
further found that the individuals' potential to dominate and con-
trol the corporation did not make them co-bidders, noting that the
individuals had no binding agreement to vote their shares or other
ties. Finally, the court found that the fact that the acquiring corpo-
ration itself was newly formed for the purpose of the acquisition
and had no elaborate financial data to'disclose did not change the
result. 2
Two of the co-bidder cases, Revlon, Inc. v. Pantry Pride, InC.7 3
and Van Dusen Air, Inc. v. APL Limited Partnership,74 concerned
the issue of whether a lender of funds for a tender offer was a co-
bidder. In Revlon, the United States District Court for the District
of Delaware concluded that a loan to be made by Chemical Bank in
71. 688 F. Supp. at 981.
72. Warnaco, Inc. v. Galef, slip op. at 14-15.
73. 621 F. Supp. 804 (D. Del. 1985).
74. Civ. No. 4-85-1256 (D. Minn. Sept. 20, 1985).
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connection with a tender offer rendered Chemical Bank a commer-
cial lender and not a co-bidder. Specifically, the court found that
Chemical Bank's perfected security interest in the target stock
(which could not be acted upon prior to a loan default and, even
then, was limited to recovery of the amount of the loan) did not
make it a co-bidder where the tender offeror was the sole purchas-
ing entity and the tender offeror's parent assumed all responsibility
for repayment of the Chemical Bank loan.75
The Revlon court also concluded that certain persons who in-
directly owned interests in the tender offeror were not bidders be-
cause they did not capitalize the tender offeror with their funds and
there was no evidence that they offered their funds to the tender
offeror to assist in the offer. Noting that the decisions in Prudent
Real Estate Trust, Riggs, and Pabst all rested on whether the de-
fendant participated financially in the tender offer, the court con-
cluded that a majority shareholder position with respect to a tender
offeror's parent, without evidence of financial participation in the
tender offer, is insufficient to constitute bidder status.76
In Van Dusen, the target argued that the loan's structure,
which tied loan fees to the results of the tender offer," made the
lender a co-bidder. The court noted, however, that the lender had
no right to influence the tender offer, could not instruct the offeror
to accept or reject tendered shares, and had no power to control the
offeror's use of its existing target shares.78 Citing what the court
referred to as the Commission's focus on bidders as "principal par-
ticipants, ' 79 the court concluded that, "in the mind of the SEC, the
distinction between bidders and the rest of humanity is not subtle,
75. 621 F. Supp. at 816-17.
76. Id. at 813-14.
77. Specifically, the lender was to receive a $150,000 commitment fee and, if the
committed funds were drawn down, a $150,000 closing fee. If the tender offeror did not
purchase additional shares under its tender offer, but instead sold its existing shares prior to
drawing down loan funds, the lender would receive 10% of the tender offeror's profit on the
sale, less reasonable expenses of conducting the offer and the $150,000 commitment fee. If,
after receiving the first loan advance, but before drawing down the full loan amount, the
tender offeror sold previously owned or tendered shares, the lender would receive 10% of
the offeror's profit up to a maximum of $400,000, with credit given for the commitment and
closing fees. Van Dusen Air, Inc. v. APL Ltd. Partnership, slip op. at 3.
78. Id.
79. See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
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but rather is used to make a simple differentiation between those
who are central to the offer and those who are not."8 The court
also noted the focus of Gray Drug "on the practical connection be-
tween the offeror and its affiliates with respect to the tender offer"
and the conclusion of the Revlon court that Chemical Bank was not
a bidder.8" The Van Dusen court applied the foregoing to conclude
that the lender was not a co-bidder because it was not a principal
participant in the tender offer in light of the facts that its activity
consisted of supplying money and collecting a fee therefor and that
it received no right to purchase or control any of the target's
shares, except for the right arising out of its security interest in the
event of a default.8 2
Three recent co-bidder cases, Koppers Co. v. American Express
Co.,83 City Capital Associates Limited Partnership v. Interco Inc.,84
and MAI Basic Four, Inc. v. Prime Computer, Inc.,S involved a
determination of the co-bidder status of an investment bank that
played multiple roles in a tender offer. In Koppers, the United
States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania
found that the multiple roles of Shearson Lehman Brothers Hold-
ings, Inc., and its affiliates (the Shearson Interests) were likely to
render the Shearson Interests co-bidders in a tender offer. The
Shearson Interests were owners of approximately 46% of the com-
mon stock of the acquiring entity (although entitled to less than
46% of the voting rights) and acted as financial adviser for the ac-
quiring entity and as a dealer-manager for the tender offer. The
Shearson Interests also were to provide approximately $570 million
of the approximately $1.7 billion needed to complete the tender of-
fer.86 In addition to their equity interests in the tender offer, the
80. Van Dusen Air, Inc. v. APL Ltd. Partnership, slip op. at 4.
81. Id. at 5.
82. Id. at 5-6.
83. 689 F. Supp. 1371 (W.D. Pa. 1988).
84. 860 F.2d 60 (3d Cir. 1988).
85. 871 F.2d 212 (1st Cir. 1989).
86. This financing was to be provided by the Shearson Interests to the acquiring entity
in one of two forms, to be determined at the discretion of the acquiring entity. Shearson
Holdings would either (i) contribute $570 million in return for unsecured senior
subordinated notes (Notes) from the acquiring entity or (ii) contribute $540 million in
return for Series B Preferred Stock of the acquiring entity and make an additional $30
million loan. Shearson Holdings was given the right to exchange the Series B Preferred
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Shearson Interests were to earn significant brokerage fees by (i) un-
derwriting the purchase of target stock and (ii) potentially under-
writing up to $570 million in securities to refinance the
contribution of the Shearson Interests, in which case the Shearson
Interests would be entitled to a fee of $2.5 million.
In finding a high probability that the target would successfully
establish at trial that the Shearson Interests were co-bidders, the
court noted the Shearson Interests' multiple roles as advisor, un-
derwriter, equity partner, and financier. The court noted the cen-
tral participatory role of the Shearson Interests and stated that it
"would find it difficult to conclude that as a matter of law, one of
the principal planners and players in [the tender offer] is exempt
from the disclosure requirements of the Williams Act solely be-
cause it would hold slightly less than a 50% interest in the tender
offeror after the purchase."87
In Interco, the Third Circuit considered whether the participa-
tion of Drexel Burnham Lambert, Inc., in a tender offer was suffi-
cient to make Drexel a co-bidder. In that case, Drexel was engaged
to raise $1.375 billion (of the $2.6 billion in financing required) for
the tender offer through the sale of preferred securities of the ac-
quiring entity. Between 29% and 36% of the common equity of
the acquiring entity was to be made available to Drexel or its desig-
nees. Drexel sought the right to place the common equity as a
"sweetener" to encourage prospective purchasers to purchase the
preferred securities. Drexel had the right to keep for itself up to
half of the 36% of common equity. However, Drexel was under no
obligation to purchase any equity interest in the acquiring entity.
Drexel was entitled to a $12 million fee if the tender offer was
successful and a $6 million fee otherwise. In addition, Drexel was
to receive a 1.125% fee for funds for which it secured written com-
mitments and 3% to 5.25% of the total gross proceeds from the
sale of debt or equity securities underwritten by Drexel. Drexel
was also to receive a $2 million fee for rendering financial advisory
Stock for Notes upon the merger of the acquiring entity and the target. If the Note option
was used, the acquiring entity would issue, and the Shearson Interests would underwrite,
up to $570 million of senior subordinated debentures to refinance the Notes. 689 F. Supp.
at 1386.
87. Id. at 1390.
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services and a $1 million fee for acting as dealer-manager. Finally,
Drexel was entitled to 15% of the profits made by certain individu-
als involved in the takeover if acquired shares were sold following
an unsuccessful takeover.
The Third Circuit found that the substantial fees to be re-
ceived by Drexel for services rendered were irrelevant to co-bidder
status and that Drexel's right, for itself and its designees, to
purchase between 29% and 36% of the common equity of the ac-
quiring entity was insufficient to confer co-bidder status.8 The
court noted that there was no indication that Drexel was to have
any control over the tender offer or any role with respect to the
acquiring entity other than as an investor, and distinguished Kop-
pers on the ground that the Shearson Interests in that case were
entitled to board representation8 9 The court viewed the issue
before it as whether a person who would hold a minority invest-
ment position in the entity surviving a tender offer is a co-bidder,90
and concluded, based on its reading of the current tender offer reg-
ulations, that such a person is not a co-bidder.9'
The dissent in Interco found that Drexel was a co-bidder. In so
doing, the dissent rejected the majority's distinction of Koppers on
the basis of board representation, concluding that the relevant test
for co-bidder status is beneficial ownership of stock.92 The dissent
found that Congress "intended that disclosure be made by those
expansively designated persons or groups obtaining the benefit of
securities ownership through a variety of arrangements, ' 93 and did
not intend to limit disclosure only to an entity or individual that
"dominates" or "controls" the group making a tender offer. 94
Thus, the dissent rejected the majority's conclusion that the holder
of a minority investment in the entity surviving a tender offer was
not a co-bidder.
88. 860 F.2d at 63.
89. Id. at 63.
90. Id. at 63-64.
91. Id. at 64-65. The decision in Interco was followed in Polaroid Corp. v. Disney, 862
F.2d 987, 991 n.2 (3d Cir. 1988), aff'g in relevant part, Polaroid Corp. v. Disney, 689 F.
Supp. 1169 (D. Del. 1988).
92. 860 F.2d at 68.
93. Id. at 67.
94. Id. at 68.
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Like Interco, Prime Computer involved the question of
whether Drexel was a co-bidder. Unlike the Third Circuit in In-
terco, the First Circuit concluded that Drexel was a co-bidder in
Prime Computer. In reaching its conclusion, the First Circuit com-
pared the facts before it to both the Koppers and Interco cases. In
likening the case before it to Koppers, the court noted that Drexel
had equity interests in various affiliates associated with one of the
principal stockholders of the acquiring entities (LeBow) and a
background of association with the acquiring entities and other
LeBow interests, participated very early in the planning of the
tender offer, had (until after the commencement of the tender offer)
a director with veto power in the corporation that owned the gen-
eral partner of the sole equity participant in the bidder group, was
instrumental in raising the $20 million of equity for the tender of-
fer, and would enjoy substantial fees (perhaps in excess of $65 mil-
lion) for its role in the tender offer. The court also noted, however,
that Drexel's projected equity position was far less than Shearson's
46% interest in Koppers."
The court found that Drexel's role in Prime Computer was dis-
tinguishable from its role in Interco because of Drexel's early and
pervasive role in the planning and execution of the Prime Computer
offer, its board representation in the corporation controlling the
sole equity participant in the bidder group, and evidence sufficient
reasonably to suggest an expectation that Drexel would itself pro-
vide additional financing for the offer if it could not place $875 mil-
lion in junk bonds.96
However, in concluding that Drexel was a co-bidder, the First
Circuit did not rely on factual distinctions from Interco, but instead
rejected what it characterized as the Third Circuit's "bright-line"
position that an entity that would be a minority stockholder after a
tender offer is not a bidder. The court adopted what it viewed as
the "more flexible, fact-based approach" of the Interco dissent.97
The First Circuit stated:
we cannot say that, as a matter of law, an active advisor-broker-
95. 871 F.2d at 219.
96. Id. at 219.
97. Id. at 219.
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financier-participant who owns less than a majority interest in
the surviving entity is not a bidder where, as here, there has
been a history of close association, equity sharing, board repre-
sentation and involvement from the beginning of the present of-
fer, and where there is the possibility of the advisor-broker being
the indispensable key to the offer's success. Nor can we say that
while a 46 percent stockholder qualifies as a bidder, a 14 percent
direct stockholder with other indirect equity interests cannot
qualify.98
Co-bidder issues were also raised in Macfadden Holdings, Inc.
v. John Blair & Co. 91 In that case, the United States District Court
for the District of Delaware determined that co-bidder status did
not apply to a privately-held corporation (Trafalgar) which was
committed to purchase $25 million in exchangeable preferred
stocki °° in the merged entity created by a tender offer if sufficient
shares were tendered to enable the merger to go forward. The ex-
changeable preferred stock, representing all the preferred stock in
the merged entity, had detachable warrants entitling Trafalgar, for
a period up to ten years, to purchase 19.9% of the common stock of
the merged entity for $6,000,000.
The court based its determination that co-bidder status did not
apply on the facts that (i) after the tender offer, Trafalgar would
not own any equity stock and, in fact, Trafalgar structured its role
in the tender offer to avoid an equity position for the foreseeable
98. Id. at 221. The First Circuit relied on "group" analysis to conclude that Drexel
was a co-bidder:
We read the "on whose behalf" language of Rule 14d-I(b)(l) to incorporate
the "group" concept of sections 13(d) and 14(d) of the Williams Act....
Our interpretation of bidder under Rule 14d-l(b)(1) is consistent with
the statute. Section 14(d) of the [Exchange Act] by explicit cross-reference
incorporates the scope of the disclosure requirements of [section 13(d) of the
Exchange Act] .... The legislative history of the latter section contradicts an
exclusive focus on control ....
... At a minimum it is evident that Drexel has "act[ed] as a partnership,
limited partnership .... or other group for the purpose of acquiring, holding,
or disposing of securities of an issuer."
Id. at 220-2 1. See supra note 42.
99. Civ. No. 86-161 MMS (D. Del. May 16, 1986).
100. The stock was redeemable at the option of the acquiring entity after five years and
was exchangeable at the option of the acquiring entity into high-yield securities after three
years. Macfadden Holdings, Inc. v. John Blair & Co., slip op. at 16 n. 12.
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future; (ii) Trafalgar had not been involved actively in the takeover
plans; and (iii) Trafalgar would have no involvement in the man-
agement of the merged company and had not discussed proposed
management with the principal participants in the acquisition." 1
The court found that this result was not altered by the fact that
Trafalgar might exercise its option to purchase up to 19.9% of the
common stock of the merged entity because there was no evidence
of an intent to exercise the warrants immediately after the merger
and, indeed, little incentive to do so as the intent of those control-
ling the tender offer was to make the merged entity a private com-
pany and exercise of the warrants would therefore give Trafalgar
the undesirable position of a minority shareholder in a private com-
pany.10 2 Nor was Trafalgar's equity contribution to the acquiring
entity sufficient to make Trafalgar a co-bidder since its $25 million
commitment was only 8% of the total financing required and, in-
cluding the $6 million Trafalgar might pay for common stock, Tra-
falgar's contribution was still less than 10% of the total financing, a
percentage which the court noted was far less than the 20% which
the Prudent Real Estate Trust court found only marginally
significant. '0 3
B. Recurrent Themes in Co-Bidder Cases
The co-bidder cases do not form a highly-structured and co-
herent body of authority. The determinations of co-bidder status in
these cases are highly fact-specific, and, even where similar facts
might have led to similar results, this has not always occurred.
Nonetheless, certain recurrent themes appear in the co-bidder
cases.
The courts that have addressed the co-bidder issue appear to
have considered financial responsibility for a tender offer to be
highly indicative of co-bidder status. Thus, courts have held that
an individual who was solely responsible for the debt incurred to
purchase tendered shares was a sole bidder (Riggs); that the entity
actually paying for tendered shares was the sole bidder where it had
101. Id. at 16-19.
102. Id. at 17.
103. Id. at 19.
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adequate cash reserves to make such payment (Gray Drug); and
that a lender was not a co-bidder where the tender offeror was the
sole purchasing entity and the tender offeror's parent assumed re-
sponsibility for repayment of the lender's loan (Revlon). However,
where financial responsibility for a tender offer is shared, there is no
clear guidance as to the level of participation that will render a
person a co-bidder. On the one hand, it has been held that the
provision of 8-10% of financing did not make the provider a co-
bidder (Macfadden), that the provision of only 20% of financing is
a factor weighing against the need for disclosure (Prudent Real Es-
tate Trust), and that a minority investment position in an acquiring
entity is not sufficient to make a person a co-bidder (Interco). On
the other hand, it has been held that a majority interest in the ac-
quiring entity is not critical to co-bidder status (Koppers, Prime
Computer).
Where an acquiring entity was formed and capitalized solely
as a vehicle for a tender offer, courts have found that the persons
who formed and capitalized the acquiring entity were "the domi-
nant and motivating principals" and "the primary motivating
force" behind the tender offer and, accordingly, were co-bidders
(Pabst, Arkansas Best). Likewise, where a majority shareholder of
a tender offeror's parent did not capitalize the tender offeror, the
shareholder was not a co-bidder (Revlon) and control of the acquir-
ing entity in excess of 90% did not confer co-bidder status where
the acquiring entity had sufficient cash reserves to pay. for the ten-
dered shares (Gray Drug). Nevertheless, at least one court has
found that individuals were not bidders where they formed and
capitalized an acquiring corporation as a legal mechanism for ef-
fecting a tender offer (Warnaco).
Courts have considered a person's involvement in, and power
to control, a tender offer as indicative of co-bidder status. Thus, a
principal planner and player in a tender offer was held to be a co-
bidder (Koppers), as was a party that was involved from the begin-
ning of a tender offer and that might prove to be an indispensable
key to the offer's success (Prime Computer). By contrast, parties
with no control over tender offers (Van Dusen, Interco) and an en-
tity contributing funds for a tender offer, but not actively involved
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in the tender offer plans, (Macfadden) were held not to be bidders.
The courts have considered post-tender offer control, like control of
the tender offer itself, to be indicative of bidder status (Prudent
Real Estate Trust, Macfadden).
Courts have sometimes found that a person's assumption of
multiple roles with respect to a tender offer is indicative of bidder
status (Koppers, Prime Computer), but this criterion is not always
determinative and, in fact, certain aspects of a person's participa-
tion in a tender offer may be deemed irrelevant to co-bidder status
(fees for services rendered found irrelevant to co-bidder status in
Interco). While multiple roles may be indicative of co-bidder sta-
tus, certain very limited roles, e.g., as lender, may indicate that co-
bidder status is not present (Revlon, Van Dusen).
Finally, in determining co-bidder status, courts have also fo-
cused on whether the alleged co-bidders acted in conjunction with
the acquiring entity (Riggs, Gray Drug).
Although the Commission was not a party to any of the co-
bidder cases and has not itself addressed the issue of what consti-
tutes co-bidder status,"° members of the Commission staff have
identified a number of factors that may be relevant to such an
analysis:
In determining whether to raise a co-bidder comment in connec-
tion with a review of a Schedule 14D-1, the staff will consider
whether the person or entity will "purchase" the tendered secur-
ities directly or indirectly through a controlled entity, or other-
wise acquire an economic interest in the target. The person also
must have the ability significantly to direct the offer. Not all
situations where there is a wholly- or majority-owned bidder
will call for a co-bidder analysis. The focus should be on
whether co-bidder status is necessary to obtain material infor-
mation that otherwise is not called for under Instruction C to
the Schedule. See City Capital Assoc. Limited Partnership v. In-
terco, Inc., 860 F.2d 60 (3d Cir. 1988).
Other factors the staff will evaluate in determining whether a
person is a co-bidder include:
104. See, e.g., Koppers Co. v. American Express Co., 689 F. Supp. 1413, 1415 (W.D.
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(i) The extent to which the person is acting in conjunction
with the named bidder;
(ii) The extent to which the person is providing equity or
debt financing for the tender offer;
(iii) The extent to which a person, directly or indirectly,
controls the named bidder;
(iv) The extent to which the person would be deemed to
own beneficially the securities purchased by the bidder pur-
suant to the offer or the assets of the target company fol-
lowing completion of the offer; and
(v) The extent to which the person controls the terms of
the tender offer.'
CONCLUSION
In recent years, participation in control transactions has taken
many forms. As a result, in order to ensure that shareholders and
the market continue to receive material information regarding such
transactions, the application of securities law disclosure require-
ments is evolving to fit these varied forms of participation. The two
mechanisms described in this Article are aspects of this evolution.
Recently, the Commission published the Proposed Rules con-
cerning significant equity participants. The Proposed Rules would
require that certain fundamental information be provided with re-
spect to participants in control transactions, i.e., major. acquisitions
of securities, tender offers, proxy contests, and going private trans-
actions, that have a specified level of equity participation. Thus,
the Proposed Rules would ensure that certain basic disclosure is
provided with respect to persons whose participation in control
contests exceeds an objectively determined level.
Co-bidder analysis, and, in particular, the co-bidder cases,
have applied a somewhat different approach in the context of
tender offers. Under this analysis, co-bidder status is determined
based on all the relevant facts and circumstances. Once co-bidder
status is established, a co-bidder is a filing person and is required to
105. Goelzer, Quinn, and Walter, supra note 53, at 84-85.
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provide all disclosure required of a tender offeror, including, where
material, financial information.
As noted in the Commission release accompanying the Pro-
posed Rules, 10 6 co-bidder analysis would be unaffected by the adop-
tion of the Proposed Rules. Hence, the Proposed Rules, if adopted,
would supplement co-bidder analysis in the case of tender offers
and would also apply to major acquisitions of securities, proxy con-
tests, and going private transactions to require basic disclosure with
respect to persons who are not so central to a control transaction
that they are required to file disclosure with respect to themselves
but who nonetheless, by virtue of their significant equity participa-
tion, are participants with respect to whom disclosure is material.
106. 54 Fed. Reg., supra note 1, at 10,364.

